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ABSTRACT 
Organizations are constantly faced with determining proper punishment or 
consequences for employees who commit acts to the contrary of company regulations and 
policies. Commonly Judge - Advisor Systems (JAS) are built into the hierarchy of 
conventional organizations, and they can have an impact on these decisions. In a JAS one 
or more persons act as an advisor giving recommendations or guidance to one or more 
persons in the judge role who ultimately makes a decision. This paper examines the 
impact that JAS and the management hierarchy system has on disciplinary decisions 
made in the corporate atmosphere. There were 157 participants in the online survey. The 
survey simulated the review of files for an employee review board hearing. The 
relationship between advisor and advice utilization as well as the relationship between 
severity of crime and advice utilization were discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the past few decades the issue of organizational misconduct has been 
increasingly important as a worldwide social issue (Szwajkowski, 1992). The ability for 
organizations to combat this sort of unethical behavior before it becomes a legal liability 
for the company has become increasingly evident. This has led to a large number of 
organizations asking that employees or members to participate in boards and committees 
to combat this behavior. Often times these groups make decisions regarding employee or 
member conduct. These decisions can greatly impact not only the organization and 
individuals involved on a small scale, but sometimes decisions can have a global impact. 
Because of this, it is very important to understand whether or not these groups operate 
effectively. 
As in all group decision-making, each member brings a different set of expertise 
(Baumann & Bonner, 2004) or information to the group. Groups have to aggregate the 
expertise and opinions of the members to come to a final decision. Recently a study 
(Bonner, Baumann, & Dalai, 2002) found that groups give more weight to input from the 
highest performing members . The ability of the group to access this expertise can 
drastically improve the success of the group (Baumann et al., 2004; Bonner, 2004). These 
members could be high-performing for a variety of reasons. They could be "exper ts" in 
the area where the decision is being made, or they could have even guessed or predicted a 
result with luck. The high-performing member ' s performance could also be a result of 
simply soliciting advice from an outside party. Because humans are social by nature and 
judgments made by these groups are considered to be important, it is realistic that 
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decision makers would tend to seek advice from outside sources or supervisors (in an 
organizational context). 
In summary there are a variety of techniques that small groups use to come to a 
consensus on a final decision. Each group member brings a different set of knowledge 
and opinions to the discussion and has a choice on whether or not to disclose all of the 
different factors determining his or her individual opinion on an issue. This paper 
focuses on a preliminary step rather than the overall group decision-making process. It 
will further examine judge advisor systems as well as advice utilization and discounting 
with hypotheses to follow. 
Judge Advisor Systems 
Whereas much of the literature around group decision-making studies a consensus 
process in coming to a final conclusion as described above, this paper focuses on the 
latter relationship between an advisor and a single decision maker. This creates a judge 
advisor system. The judge advisor system, sometimes referred to as a JAS, occurs where 
a " judge" or decision maker solicits advice from other group members to compare it with 
his or her own knowledge and come to a conclusion (Savadori, Van Swol, & Sniezek, 
2001 ; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995; Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001 ; Van Swol & Ludutsky, 
2007; Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005). Ultimately the judge has the final say in the decision 
while one or more advisors may have given advice (Van Swol et al., 2007) and 
participated in the process. 
Advice may be solicited from advisors for multiple reasons. Information may be 
requested to improve the final decision or even to give the decision maker or judge more 
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confidence in the final decision (Sniezek et al., 1995; Sniezek et al., 2001 ; Van Swol et 
al., 2007; Van Swol & et al., 2005). 
Research in the field has previously found that there are many factors that can 
give rise to differences in final decisions. An example of this is that a more confident 
advisor 's advice is generally accepted more often than the advice of a less confident 
advisor (Sniezek et al., 2005; Sniezek et al., 2001 ; Van Swol et al., 2007; Van Swol et al., 
2005; Yaniv, 1997). Humans are also inclined to like people who are similar to them and 
more inclined to accept a request if they like the person making it (Gino, Shang & 
Croson, 2009). Research on the implications of the role of the advisor and judge in an 
organizational hierarchy has not been explored, and this paper attempts to begin that 
research. 
Advice Utilization and Discounting 
Advice utilization can be equated with how a judge follows advice in making a 
decision, and discounting refers to the extent to which advice is ignored or personal 
opinions are utilized in the decision making process (Bonaccio et. al, 2006). Decision 
makers solicit advice for a variety of reasons. T w o notable reasons are to share 
accountability for the outcome of a situation or improve the probability that the final 
decision will be correct or optimal (Bonaccio, et al., 2006; Harvey & Fischer, 1997). In 
the case of this study, it is realistic to assume that a judge could accept advice based on 
these two justifications. It is also important to realize that whether a judge chooses to 
utilize or discount advice, the sheer act of interaction forces a decision maker to think 
about a situation differently (Bonaccio, et al., 2006). The offering of advice gives a judge 
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information that they might not have previously known or an alternative that they might 
not have considered (Heath & Gonzales, 1995). 
Whereas it is commonly assumed when studying group decision-making that 
group member ' s roles are equal, in organizations, there is generally a hierarchy and role 
structure in place (Bonaccio et al., 2005). Contributions and advice utilization in 
decisions made in formal organizations are generally unequal. This means that countless 
important and significant decisions are made in an atmosphere that is not solely 
individual or equally cooperative (Bonaccio et al., 2005; Sniezek et al., 1995). A judge 
must evaluate for him or herself the relevance of the advice, the "expert" status of the 
advisor, and decide the correct weight of importance to apply to the advice as well as his 
or her own opinion. There can be a social pressure to not reject advice it if is offered 
freely, because in the future the advisor might not offer advice again (Sniezek et al., 
1995; Bonaccio et al., 2006). In an organizational hierarchy where an advisor could have 
a direct impact on employment status, opportunities afforded to the judge, or training of a 
judge , this could have great influence on advice utilization. This leads into to my first 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Participants will assign a higher value to advice provided by direct 
managers or supervisors than that provided by subordinates or indirect managers . 
Due to the organizational structure, the perceived "experience" of the advisor 
could translate into confidence. Whereas confidence on the part of the advisor can affect 
decisions made in a judge advisor system, the confidence that a judge has in him or 
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herself can also impact final decisions. The ability that a person believes in the correct or 
Tightness of his or her opinion is valid in combining the opinions into a final decision 
(Zarnoth & Sniezek, 1997; Van Swol, 2009). It is very likely in many situations that the 
receipt of advice will cause a conflict between personal opinions and the advice (Yaniv, 
et al., 2000). Previous research has shown that judges tend to weigh their own opinion 
much more heavily than that of an advisor, even if they feel that advisor is competent and 
offering good advice (Bonaccio, et al., 2006; Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, et al., 
2000). An explanation of this is that judges have readily available access to their own 
decision- making processes as well as the supporting evidence and reasoning behind their 
own opinions. They have an easier t ime justifying their own decisions versus the 
decision of another individual because of the certainty in the support of their decision 
(Yaniv, et al., 2000). People are subject to their personal opinions on a much more 
frequent basis than they are exposed to the opinions of others. This gives rise to my 
second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Participants will assign a higher value to their personal opinions as the 
severity of the employee misconduct increases. 
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M E T H O D S 
Study Overview 
This study is concerned with the how the relationship between the participant and 
an expert advisor affects the outcomes of the judgment -maker ' s decisions. A 3 x 5 fully-
crossed factorial design was used. To simulate a realistic organizational structure, there 
were three types of relationships between the participant or judge and the advisor: an 
indirect manager, a direct manager, and a subordinate were all introduced as advisors. 
There were five types of advice or recommendations given by the advisors: unpaid leave; 
termination; criminal action; unpaid leave and criminal action; and termination and 
criminal action. This same design was used to investigate the effects of these variables 
across three different situations or blocks with differing severities of employee 
misconduct. The first factor is between-subjects. Each participant receives advice from 
one of the three advisors at random for each paradigm. The second factor is also 
between-subjects. Each participant receives a different combination of advice at random. 
The participants are then left to make the decision for punishment from five options made 
up of unpaid leave; termination; and criminal action, which served as the primary 
dependent variable in this study. This design is used to test the hypotheses above. The 
text of the survey can be found in Appendix B. 
Design 
An Internet survey built on Qualtrics software was used. Data was collected on a 
total of 157 participants. 
The experiment was divided into 5 blocks or sections. The first block introduced 
the participant to the study. This block set up the hypothetical scenario where the 
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respondent in the survey was one member of an employee conduct review board 
receiving case files for three different criminal actions committed at work. Block two was 
devoted to the first scenario in which the employee committed an act of vandalism. This 
scenario was the least severe crime. Block three was devoted to the second scenario in 
which the employee committed manslaughter under the influence of an illegal substance. 
This was the most severe criminal action. Block 4 was devoted to the third scenario in 
which the employee committed an act of embezzlement. White collar crime, like the 
scenario found in block 4 has grown at an alarming rate in the last few decades 
(Szwajkowski, 1992). The last block is where demographic information and information 
related to the participant 's idea of how the decision was made was collected. 
Respondents were asked age, gender, race, and employment questions (Appendix A). 
Crime 1: Vandalism 
In the first paradigm, 61 out of 151 participants were offered advice from an 
indirect manager; 38 participants were offered advice from a direct manager; and 52 
participants were offered advice from a subordinate worker. 
Crime 2: Manslaughter Under the Influence of Illegal Substance 
In the second paradigm, 54 out of 152 participants were offered advice from an 
indirect manager; 59 participants were offered advice from a direct manager; and 39 
participants were offered advice from a subordinate worker. 
Crime 3: Embezzlement 
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In the third paradigm, 59 out of 143 participants were offered advice from an 
indirect manager; 44 participants were offered advice from a direct manager; and 40 
participants were offered advice from a subordinate worker. 
Participants 
Participants were recruited through the online Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 
system. One hundred fifty-seven participants initially participated in the survey, with 143 
and 152 providing usable data on any given scenario. The reason for the removal 
participants ' data was incompleteness of the experiment. Some participants only partially 
completed the survey, but if there was data for an entire block of questions, then it was 
considered relevant. Each participant was given an incentive of $0.50 for completing the 
survey. 
The majority of survey participants were females at 6 3 % of the total sample. The 
age of participants ranged from 18 to over 65 years old. Seventy-eight percent were 
White/Caucasian. Other demographics of participants can be found in Appendix A. 
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RESULTS 
The three different blocks containing questions relevant to the three 
corresponding conduct scenarios of the survey were treated individually, and incomplete 
data in any block was thrown out. An example is if a respondent skipped an answer in 
Block 2 but completed the rest of the survey, his or her data was used in Block 3 and 
Block 4 and excluded from the Block 2 analysis. There were also a small number of 
respondents that closed the survey without even viewing all of the questions. This 
resulted in less than 5 % of the initial sample being thrown out before analysis. 
Two crosstabs of the data from the three blocks of the survey can be found in 
Appendices D and E. The first crosstab shows the three different crime scenarios cross 
referenced with the advice given as well as the final choices that were selected by the 
participant (Appendix D). The second crosstab cross references the advice giver, advice, 
and the final choice (Appendix E). Three statistical tests were performed on the data: a 
Pearson Chi-Square, Likelihood Ratio, and Linear-by-Linear Association. 
Analysis of the first crosstab (Appendix D) shows assumption significances lower 
than 0.05 only in the Crime 1 or Vandalism scenario/Block 2. This shows a linkage 
between the crime and the advice utilization of the respondent. In the other two blocks 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, therefore as the severity of the crimes increased, 
there was an adverse relationship with the acceptance of advice. Bar graphs in Appendix 
D give a visual representation of the data from crosstab 1. 
The assumption significances in the second crosstab (Appendix E) vary much 
more between tests than in the first crosstab. In the case where advice was given by an 
indirect supervisor, all three tests show significance. The significances are p<0.05: p = 
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0.018, p = 0.006, and p = 0.040, for the chi-square, likelihood ration and linear-by-linear 
measures respectively. There is a correlation between the indirect manager as an advice 
giver and the utilization of advice. The direct manager ' s advice was only shown to be 
utilized a significant amount of the t ime by the likelihood ratio with a value of p = 0.029. 
From this it can ' t be concluded that chance didn ' t play a major factor in the acceptance of 
the direct manager ' s advice. The respondent 's opinions could have simply aligned with 
the advice in a number of cases. It was deemed that the advice coming from the 
subordinate worker could be assumed to be utilized a significant amount of time in the 
study. The chi-square assumed a significance of p = 0.007 and the likelihood ratio 
assumed a significance of p = 0.003. The linear-by-linear association doesn ' t show 
significance, however. The significance of this test was p = 0.295. Overall it can be 
assumed that there was significance. Bar graphs showing the visual representation of this 
data are found in Appendix E. 
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DISCUSSION 
This study examined the decision maker ' s desire to accept or reject advice when 
making decisions on employee misconduct. Frequently in these types of situations the 
judge advisor system structure is used. It is common for decision makers to solicit advice 
from other people before making an important decision. It is also not uncommon for this 
to be a formal process in an office or organization. Many organizations have conduct or 
review boards made up of employees or members . Some people also depend on co­
workers or subordinates to review and summarize files and reports for them to free up 
t ime in their schedule. This study aimed to create a realistic hypothetical situation 
simulating a situation similar to these types of boards and file reviewing systems. 
I predicted that in the survey, participants would tend to trust the advice of direct 
superiors in the organizational hierarchy (Hypothesis 1). While many subordinates are 
depended on to summarize information, they don ' t have the "expert" status that managers 
tend to have. The translation of expertise into confidence is also a very real possibility. 
Peterson & Pitz (1988) stated that as decision maker ' s confidence in advice, uncertainty 
decreases. This sense of certainty can be an influential aspect to judge advisor system 
decision-making. 
Hypothesis 1 was only weakly supported by the analysis of the data where an 
indirect manager gave advice. The significance found when the subordinate offered 
advice, as well as the lack of significance found in the direct manager ' s advice suggests 
that the hypothesis is not supported. In the study, participants were actually more likely 
to accept the advice of an indirect manager or a subordinate than his or her direct 
supervisor. 
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This could be a result of many factors. It has been found in much of the research 
on the topic of judge advisor systems that judges do not follow advisor 's 
recommendations as much as they should have (to benefit by making a more successful 
or accurate choice). Judges tend to weigh their own opinion much more heavily than that 
of an advisor, even if they feel confident that the advisor is relevant (Bonaccio, et al., 
2006; Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, et al., 2000). An explanation offered by Yaniv 
and Kleinberger (2000) is that judges have readily available access to their own decision­
making processes as well as the supporting evidence and reasoning behind their own 
opinions. They have an easier time justifying their own decisions versus the decision of 
another individual because of the certainty in the support of their decision. It would be a 
much more time consuming process for a judge to solicit the reasoning behind how an 
advisor came to his or her conclusions rather than just following what they already think 
to be true or right. In this study there was also no opportunity for this kind of feedback to 
a participant. Advisors were simulated characters that participants in the study could not 
ask questions. 
In contrast to the other theories, Krueger (2003) attributes this discounting factor 
to an ego-centric bias. Judges could simply find their own opinions more important or 
better than the opinions of others. This can even be the case when the implications of 
decisions, like the power of the supervisor over the judge ' s position in the organization, 
are evident (Bonaccio, et al., 2006; Krueger, 2003). Whereas in the reasoning asserted by 
Yaniv and Kleinberger (2000), a judge would only be thinking about his or her decision 
versus the advice of an advisor for a short time period, this theory of ego-centric bias is 
based on a long-term influence of one ' s own opinion. In a study by Harvey and Harries 
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(2004) participants even gave more weight to a contrary opinon when it had been 
mislabeled as their own opinion. In the case of criminal activity, people have been 
primed by news stories and articles about the punishment of criminals since early 
childhood in most cases. This aggregate of information could explain the likelihood of 
participants in this study to ignore recommendations from advisors in cases of severe 
criminal misconduct. The judge ' s opinion could be so deeply imbedded in his or her 
mind, that the judge isn ' t conscious of the discounting of the advice that is taking place. 
In Hypothesis 2 , 1 predicted that respondents or judges would utilize the advice of 
the advisors less as the severity of the crime increased. From the results in the crosstab 1 
statistics (Appendix D) Hypothesis 2 can be supported. Significance between the advice 
and crime was only found in the least severe crime scenario. The lack of significance 
between advice utilization and more severe crimes could be due to many factors. 
One such factor is that in prior research, advice utilization has been linked both 
theoretically (Bonaccio, et al. 2006) and empirically (Yaniv, et al., 2000) to the quality of 
that advice. It isn ' t out of the question that a judge would discount poor advice more 
often than accepting and utilizing it (Bonaccio, et al. 2006). In this study, advice or 
recommendations were assigned to participants at random. The data could have been 
skewed by the receipt of advice by participants that was not adequate for the crime 
involved. For example, in the case of manslaughter, it could be asserted that in almost 
every single case, most people would choose "pursue criminal action against the 
employee" as at least one of the punishments. However, the advice given could have 
been, "give the employee one week of unpaid leave." This amount of randomization in 
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such a small sample size could have been counter-productive in achieving realistic 
results. 
Limitations and Future Research Opportunities 
I believe that this study was relevant in soliciting information about the way that 
people make decisions within organizations and judge advisor structures in particular. 
However, after examining the results in detail as well as reviewing the methods, there 
were many limitations to this study, and the results would be more conclusive with 
elimination of these limitations. 
The sample size was relatively small, and the survey itself could be improved 
drastically. As I have stated previously, problems with randomization could have given 
participants recommendations that are unrealistic to the particular misconduct in 
question. Interactivity within the survey was not permitted by this first study. This could 
simulate a more realistic situation where judges have the ability to ask the advisor 
questions related to the advice. 
One survey is not adequate to produce conclusive results on this topic. An in-
person study would help make the scenarios more realistic for participants, leading to 
more realistic results. Even though it was stated who the advisor was, in an online study 
it can be reasonably predicted that some respondents didn ' t read or adequately understand 
the scenario before answering questions. 
M y study involved a lack of a feedback component as well. While there were 
some questions asked about how a respondent came to a final decision, I believe that this 
is an important component that I didn ' t study adequately. Information relating to the 
background of the respondent and how they see the three types of advisors in his or her 
own experience could be very valuable. If a respondent currently has a secretary that he 
or she trusts very much, that respondent could be thinking about that particular secretary 
when receiving a recommendation from the hypothetical secretary. The opposite could 
be true as well. This sort of priming is important to know for complete assumptions to be 
developed. 
Even with the faults in the survey and limitations, I do still believe that the 
hypotheses that I asserted could be proven true with further research. Gino et. al. (2008) 
found that judges might be more willing to listen to advice when judging other 's actions 
than their own. People don ' t use the same strategies when judging others as they do 
when judging themselves. Accessibility to our own self-information is less complex 
(Gino et. al. (2008); Moore & Small, 2007), so seeking advice to come to conclusions 
about others is very relevant. With a larger quantity of more comprehensive data, along 
with the support of prior research, these hypotheses could be proven true. 
Future research should concentrate on correcting these limitations. Observations 
using participants and advisors who have real social relationships should be examined as 
well. I am unsure if these relationships can be adequately modeled in a simulated 
situation to reflect the way that people interact in real life. More research could help 
managers in organizations understand the judge advisor structure in making group 
decisions effectively and efficiently. 
Conclusion 
People make interactive decisions multiple times every day. Our society has 
become so inter-connected that we barely make any decisions on our own. This study 
primarily focuses on formal group decision-making, but it can be translated into 
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predictions about informal decision making as well. As I think about the amount of 
advice that I solicit about my everyday decisions, it is immense. I ask others to give me 
advice on a variety of topics from questions on personal relationships, large and small 
purchases, and even what I should choose to eat for dinner. Because of the advancements 
of technology, the availability of the opinions of others is much higher than ever before. 
This also creates a di lemma in what advice to trust. If a judge doesn ' t accept the advice 
of a supervisor at work about a work-related problem, what does that say about that 
particular individual 's decision-making processes as a whole? Who do they seek advice 
from? Can the process be simulated in a controlled environment? I speculate that all of 
these questions could possibly be answered by further research in the areas of judge 
advisor systems and advice utilization and discounting. 
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Appendix A 
Respondent 's Demographics 
Measure Composition 
Gender 58 (36.7%) male; 100 (63.3%) female 
Age 54 (34.2%) 18-25 years old; 36 (22.8%) 26-34 years old; 43 
(27.2%) 35-54 years old; 21 (13.3%) 55-64 years old; 4 
(2.5%) 65 and over 
Race 123 (78.9%) White/Caucasian; 10 (6.3%) African 
American; 4 (2.5%) Hispanic; 17 (10.8%) Asian; 1 (0.6%) 
Native American; 3 (1.9%) other 
Employment Status 34 (21.5%) self-employed; 27 (17.1%) management 
position; 9 (5.7%) retired; 44 (27.9%) unemployed; 43 
(27.2%) other; 1 (0.6%) unknown 
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Appendix B 
The following survey was built on Qualtrics Software found at 
www, qua! tri es .com. 
Introduction 
You are part of an employee review board, charged with the task of reviewing employees 
who have engaged in misconduct while at work. This month the board will be reviewing 
three incidents involving employee misconduct and making decisions regarding further 
action of the company. 
In each situation you are given a file where the incident is described. 
B L O C K 1 
Advice Scenario A 
Advice Giver Options: 
1. You receive a file detailing the first incident from the human resources manager, 
who has reviewed the file and inserted advice on what action should be taken by 
the board. 
2. You receive a file detailing the first incident from your direct supervisor, who has 
reviewed the file and inserted advice on what action should be taken by the board. 
3. You receive a file detailing the first incident from your secretary, who has 
reviewed the file and inserted advice on what action should be taken by the board. 
Scenario A 
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Employee A admitted to vandalizing an outdoor employee break area. Surveillance 
video shows the employee breaking a bench, spray-painting the side of the building, and 
overturning garbage cans. 
Advice Options: 
1. I recommend that in the case of Employee A the board requires the following: 
The employee should be given one week of unpaid leave. 
2. I recommend that in the case of Employee A the board requires the following: 
The company should pursue criminal action against the employee. 
3. I recommend that in the case of Employee A the board requires the following: 
The employee should be given one week of unpaid leave. 
The company should pursue criminal action against the employee. 
4. I recommend that in the case of Employee A the board requires the following: 
The employee should be terminated. 
The company should pursue criminal action against the employee. 
5. I recommend that in the case of Employee A the board requires the following: 
The employee should be terminated. 
The board has several options in reviewing Employee A ' s case. Any combination of the 
following may be taken by the board. Please take careful consideration and choose all of 
the actions you would recommend the board take. 
Final Decision Options (choose all applicable): 
Pursue criminal action against the employee. 
Give the employee unpaid leave. 
Terminate the employee. 
BLOCK 2 
Advice Scenario B 
Advice Giver Options: 
1. You receive a file detailing the second incident from the human resources 
manager, who has reviewed the file and inserted advice on what action should be 
taken by the board. 
2. You receive a file detailing the second incident from your direct supervisor, who 
has reviewed the file and inserted advice on what action should be taken by the 
board. 
3. You receive a file detailing the second incident from your secretary, who has 
reviewed the file and inserted advice on what action should be taken by the board. 
Scenario B 
24 
Employee B admitted to fatally injuring a co-worker while under the influence of an 
illegal substance. The employee was driving a forklift in the warehouse when the 
incident occurred. 
Advice Options: 
1. I recommend that in the case of Employee B the board requires the following: 
The employee should be given one week of unpaid leave. 
2. I recommend that in the case of Employee B the board requires the following: 
The company should pursue criminal action against the employee. 
3. I recommend that in the case of Employee B the board requires the following: 
The employee should be given one week of unpaid leave. 
The company should pursue criminal action against the employee. 
4. I recommend that in the case of Employee B the board requires the following: 
The employee should be terminated. 
The company should pursue criminal action against the employee. 
5. I recommend that in the case of Employee B the board requires the following: 
The employee should be terminated. 
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The board has several options in reviewing Employee B ' s case. Any combination of the 
following may be taken by the board. Please take careful consideration and choose all of 
the actions you would recommend the board take. 
Final Decision Options (choose all applicable): 
Pursue criminal action against the employee. 
Give the employee unpaid leave. 
Terminate the employee. 
B L O C K 3 
Advice Scenario C 
Advice Giver Options: 
1. You receive a file detailing the third incident from the human resources manager, 
who has reviewed the file and inserted advice on what action should be taken by 
the board. 
2. You receive a file detailing the third incident from your direct supervisor, who has 
reviewed the file and inserted advice on what action should be taken by the board. 
3. You receive a file detailing the third incident from your secretary, who has 
reviewed the file and inserted advice on what action should be taken by the board. 
Scenario C 
Employee C admitted to embezzlement of more than $25,000 from a union investment 
fund. Employee C had complete control of all of the accounts of the investment fund as 
manager of the fund. The bookkeeping system of the fund was also manipulated to show 
payments to entities other than the Employee, however records show the missing checks 
used to funnel cash into personal accounts. 
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Advice Options: 
1. I recommend that in the case of Employee C the board requires the following: 
The employee should be given one week of unpaid leave. 
2. I recommend that in the case of Employee C the board requires the following: 
The company should pursue criminal action against the employee. 
3. I recommend that in the case of Employee C the board requires the following: 
The employee should be given one week of unpaid leave. 
The company should pursue criminal action against the employee. 
4. I recommend that in the case of Employee C the board requires the following: 
The employee should be terminated. 
The company should pursue criminal action against the employee. 
5. I recommend that in the case of Employee C the board requires the following: 
The employee should be terminated. 
The board has several options in reviewing Employee C ' s case. Any combination of the 
following may be taken by the board. Please take careful consideration and choose all of 
the actions you would recommend the board take. 
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Final Decision Options (choose all applicable): 
Pursue criminal action against the employee. 
Give the employee unpaid leave. 
Terminate the employee. 
B L O C K 4 
Decision Making 
Using the scale below, please describe how much thought did you put into deciding what 
actions the board should take in each case. 












Using the scale below, please describe how much the advice that you were given 
influenced your decisions. 
I ignored the recommendation and used solely my own personal judgment . 
0 
1 2 
1 followed the recommendation a little and also used personal judgment . 
3 
4 5 
I mostly followed the recommendation. 
7 
8 9 
I did exactly what was recommended. 
10 
What is your gender? 
Male Female 








65 or over 








How would you classify your employment? 
Please describe your employment classification. 
Block 8 
MTurk Code = AmberQU 
Appendix C 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
advice * choice * crime 449 100.0% 0 . 0 % 449 100.0% 
advice * choice * 
advicegiver 
4 4 9 a 100.0% 0 . 0% 449 100.0% 
a. Number of valid cases is different from the total count in the crosstabulation table 
because the cell counts have been rounded. 
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Appendix D 
The following crosstab, statistical information, and graphs refer to the cross 
tabulation of the advice, final choice by the judge , and the crime or block assigned to 
the respondent. 
advice * choice * c r i m e 
C r o s s t a b 
Count 
choice 
crime 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 Total 
1.00 advice 1.00 8 0 3 1 1 13 
2.00 1 3 1 2 0 7 
3.00 0 2 6 0 5 13 
4.00 6 22 8 16 9 61 
5.00 14 8 8 10 17 57 
Total 29 35 26 29 32 151 
2.00 advice 1.00 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2.00 1 3 1 4 3 12 
3.00 3 1 2 1 5 12 
4.00 26 25 20 22 23 116 
5.00 2 0 0 2 1 5 
Total 32 29 23 29 33 146 
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3.00 advice 1.00 1 0 1 0 0 2 
2.00 5 3 4 2 3 17 
3.00 1 0 5 0 0 6 
4.00 27 18 26 26 13 110 
5.00 5 2 2 2 6 17 
Total 39 23 38 30 22 152 
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C h i - S q u a r e Tes ts 
crime Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
1.00 Pearson Chi-Square 4 9 .8 43 a 16 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 52.918 16 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
4.598 1 .032 
N of Valid Cases 151 
2.00 Pearson Chi-Square 14.082 b 16 .593 
Likelihood Ratio 15.305 16 .502 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.633 1 .105 
N of Valid Cases 146 
3.00 Pearson Chi-Square 22 .789 c 16 .119 
Likelihood Ratio 22.405 16 .131 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.101 1 .294 
N of Valid Cases 152 
a. 15 cells (60.0%) have expected count less than 5. The min imum 
expected count is 1.21. 
b. 20 cells (80.0%) have expected count less than 5. The min imum 
expected count is .16. 
c. 20 cells (80.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is .29. 
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c r i m e = 2 . 0 0 
Crime 2.00 = Embezzlement 
36 
c r i m e = 3 . 0 0 
choice 





* Crime 3.00 = Manslaughter 
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Appendix E 
The following crosstab, statistical information, and graphs refer to the cross 
tabulation of the advice, final choice by the judge , and the crime or block assigned to the 
respondent. 
advice * choice * advicegiver 
C r o s s t a b 
Count 
Choice 
advicegiver 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 Total 
1.00 advice 1.00 4 0 0 1 1 6 
2.00 2 5 3 5 0 15 
3.00 1 3 2 0 3 9 
4.00 22 22 25 24 19 112 
5.00 7 4 2 6 13 32 
Total 36 34 32 36 36 174 
2.00 advice 1.00 0 0 3 0 1 4 
2.00 3 2 3 0 4 12 
3.00 2 0 5 1 4 12 
4.00 20 23 16 22 14 95 
5.00 6 2 4 4 5 21 
Total 31 27 31 27 28 144 
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3.00 advice 1.00 5 0 1 0 0 6 
2.00 2 2 0 3 2 9 
3.00 1 0 6 0 3 10 
4.00 17 20 13 18 12 80 
5.00 8 4 4 4 6 26 
Total 33 26 24 25 23 131 
39 
C h i - S q u a r e Tes ts 
advicegiver Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
1.00 Pearson Chi-Square 29 .926 a 16 .018 
Likelihood Ratio 33.954 16 .006 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
4.203 1 .040 
N of Valid Cases 174 
2.00 Pearson Chi-Square 24 .128 b 16 .087 
Likelihood Ratio 28.294 16 .029 
Linear-by- Linear 
Association 
.648 1 .421 
N of Valid Cases 144 
3.00 Pearson Chi-Square 33 .278 c 16 .007 
Likelihood Ratio 35.418 16 .003 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.098 1 .295 
N of Valid Cases 131 
a. 15 cells (60.0%) have expected count less than 5. The min imum 
expected count is 1.10. 
b. 20 cells (80.0%) have expected count less than 5. The min imum 
expected count is .75. 
c. 18 cells (72.0%o) have expected count less than 5. The min imum 
expected count is 1.05. 






1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
a d v i c e 
Advice giver 1.00 = Human Resources Manager 
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a d v i c e g i v e r = 2 . 0 0 
25-
15" 











1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
a d v i c e 
* Advice giver 2.00 = Direct Supervisor 
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Amber Rene Shanafelt 
November 16, 1988 
McCamey, Texas 
1671 Troy Court 
Kemmerer , Wyoming 83101 
